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History in the Making
Hyperdemocracy: Euroscepticism and Elections
in the United Kingdom
By Edward Reminiskey
Abstract: In the early hours of June 24th, 2016, the results of a
referendum asking the United Kingdom to determine its
membership status in the European Union were made official.
Decided by a slim majority, the decision was made by the
electorate to leave the European Union. To characterize this
moment as being uncertain would be an understatement. It stood
as a major turning point in twenty-first century politics, and
presents an opportunity to explore the recent phenomenon
affecting liberal democracy. “Brexit,” as it would be referred to,
instigated scholars to ask important questions about the
contemporary state of liberal democracy. What happens when a
liberal democracy undermines itself? How can scholars
characterize the latest trends in liberal democracy? This paper
attempts to answer these types of questions by viewing recent
developments in the United Kingdom, utilizing the lens of
hyperdemocracy theory, and applying it to elections and political
media analysis.

Initial scholarly work done on hyperdemocracy is significant, but
application of such an underdeveloped theory requires additional
discussion. In continuing that discussion, this paper will review
the precise definition of hyperdemocracy and demonstrate how it is
applicable to a specific event like the Brexit referendum. The
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reason hyperdemocracy can be used to analyze Brexit, has much to
do with the politics leading to the 2016 vote. While the politics are
important, this paper additionally focuses on the behavior of the
traditional media in the referendum campaign, supporting the main
argument that hyperdemocracy was encouraged by the traditional
media. Instead of turning to traditional media, the British people
took advantage of the social media phenomenon, an imperative of
hyperdemocracy and the information age.
Hyperdemocracy
The term hyperdemocracy has appeared in the lexicon of political
science at various instances. In Hyperdemocracy, written by
political theorist Stephen Welch, he discusses in his prelude that
the term hyperdemocracy has only been used in specific
frameworks, or has been tossed around without much care on the
internet.1 Most notably, the term was used by Spanish philosopher
José Ortega y Gasset in his book, Revolt of the Masses, to describe
a state where the “masses” obtain political power by undermining
the rule of law and exerting its will through “material pressure.”
Welch and his seemingly overlooked body of work, offers an
important discussion on the political-theoretical definition of
hyperdemocracy that transcends many preceding explanations.2
As the prefix would suggest, a literal definition of
hyperdemocracy may cause one to assume that it is simply an
excess of democratic zeal. Welch contends that while being
important in medical terminology, hyper- cannot be applied in an
explanation of democracy.3 Welch argues that democracy cannot
1

Stephen Welch, Hyperdemocracy (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2013), 1.
I came across this theory in my research endeavors. I was trying to articulate a
term to describe the state of politics that preceded Brexit. With accurate
precision, Welch theorizes the conditions that arguably made Brexit, as well as
other seismic events like the Trump presidency, possible. His conclusions from
the time Hyperdemocracy was published coincidentally aligned with my
preconceived thoughts on what is being discussed here and in my other research.
3
Welch, Hyperdemocracy, 2.
2
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be precisely measured in terms of numerical value or quantity. For
example, doctors can measure the severity of hyperthermia by
taking a patient’s temperature. However, a doctor cannot use those
numbers alone to diagnose; further examination of reliable
symptomatic indicators is needed to treat the patient.
Hyperdemocracy, as a theoretical framework, uses this kind of
qualitative and theoretical analysis; it looks at the symptoms
beyond the numbers. It is important to note that this is not to
dismiss the quantitative work of political scientists. However, for
the purposes of this paper, hyperdemocracy as a theory is being
used to historically analyze a specific moment in British politics.
Welch ultimately concludes that the best definition of
hyperdemocracy can simply be described as the intensification of
democracy.4 But what does this intensification mean? The kind of
pluralism that should exist in a healthy democratic system bleeds
uncontrollably into all levels of society, from the actual political
arena into the media, workplace, schools, families, and so on.
Welch makes the important statement that the “constitutive”
elements that make up democracy are democratized themselves.5
Thus, there is an undermining effect, where the intensification of
democracy makes democracy a less viable system of governance.
There is much to add to Welch’s theory. Borrowing from
another hyper-ism prominent in social and cultural criticism,
hyperdemocracy may additionally be characterized by the same
inversion or distortion found in hypermodernity. Hypermodernity,
as put best by French social theorist Gilles Lipovetsky, is the phase
succeeding postmodernism, and is defined by hyperconsumption
and hypermodern individuals wherein a society’s quick
progression becomes the norm, and the sense of time becomes
alien. His ideas on hypermodernity were originally applied to
consumerist societies, but are easily relatable to Welch’s theory of
hyperdemocracy:

4
5

Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 4.
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The first version of modernity was extreme in
ideological and political terms; the new modernity
is extreme in a way that goes beyond the political –
extreme in terms of technologies, media,
economics, town planning, consumption, and
individual pathology. Pretty much everywhere,
hyperbolic and sub-political processes now
comprise the new face of liberal democracies. Not
everything is dancing to the tune of excess, but
nothing is safe, one way or another, from the logic
of the extreme.6
Nevertheless, hypermodernity is not completely divorced from the
political discussion on hyperdemocracy. The bleeding effect
described by Welch is not without merit; it is grounded in larger
themes about technological and societal progress. Research on this
topic synthesizes these concepts and theories and applies them to a
specific and unique moment in British politics, beginning an
important discussion on the most compelling features that define
twenty-first-century liberal democracy.
A Summary of Euroscepticism in British Elections
While hyperdemocracy does not necessarily translate into “more
elections,” a thorough analysis of the EU issue cannot ignore the
electoral history of the United Kingdom that preceded Brexit.
While the referendum campaign officially started on April 15,
2016, the demand for a referendum and the issue itself predates
this by many years. The issue did not come to the forefront
electorally until after the 2008 global financial crisis. However, it
would be a mistake to suggest that the issue originated in the
global financial crisis. Ironically, the argument to leave
6

Gilles Lipovetsky, “Time Against Time, or The Hypermodern Society,” in
Supplanting the Postmodern: An Anthology of Writings on the Arts and Culture
of the Early 21st Century, eds. David Rudrum and Nicholas Stavris, 156-171
(London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015).
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conceivably began immediately after the referendum campaign to
join the EU in 1973. Neither can one leave out Margaret
Thatcher’s departure from British politics. Her decision to step
down from her tenure as leader of the Conservatives in the early
1990s was largely due to her opposition of any further European
integration. Her own party was committed to supporting the newly
ratified Treaty of Maastricht, which laid the foundation for a
political and monetary union.7 When the United Kingdom
attempted to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism, a currency
valuation scheme for European currencies wishing to join the Euro,
it quickly had to retract its ambition to join the common currency
in the fiasco known as Black Wednesday. Nevertheless, the
European issue would never reach the levels of intensity it has seen
in the twenty-first century. Therefore, the following section will
summarize the key people and events that encouraged the British
government to throw the European issue to the public in a
referendum, thus initiating the conditions necessary for
hyperdemocracy.
The Treaty of Lisbon ratified in 2009 is perhaps the key
turning point in the story of how the United Kingdom came to
leave the EU. The most powerful harbingers of Euroscepticism
came from the Conservatives, who at this time were the national
opposition in the UK Parliament, but had gained a plurality of seats
from the United Kingdom in the 2009 European Parliament
elections. In response to the ongoing negotiation and ratification of
Lisbon by the majority Labour government headed by Prime
Minister Gordon Brown, the Conservatives significantly changed
their tune regarding European politics. Due to their dissatisfaction
with provisions in the Treaty of Lisbon, the Conservatives left the
major center-right European People’s Party, and formed their own
party known as the Alliance of European Conservatives and
Reformists.8 This was party leader David Cameron’s appeasement
to Eurosceptics in his own party, and was used to temporarily quell
7

Frederick Painton, "It Is Time to Go," Time 136, no. 24 (1990): 60-65.
“Conservative MEPs Form New Group,” BBC News, last modified June 22,
2009, accessnews.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8112581.stm.

8
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the rise of the UK Independence Party led by Nigel Farage, a
populist juggernaut of anti-EU politics:
We believe Britain’s interests are best served by
membership of a European Union that is an
association of its Member States. We will never
allow Britain to slide into a federal Europe.
Labour’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty without
the consent of the British people has been a betrayal
of this country’s democratic traditions. In
government, we will put in place a number of
measures to make sure this shameful episode can
never happen again.9
The UK Independence Party (UKIP) is a “rejectionist-Eurosceptic”
party, as opposed to, generally speaking, “reformist-Eurosceptic”
Conservatives, who advocate for the complete withdrawal of the
United Kingdom from the EU.10 The party began in the 1990s in
response to the passage of the Treaty of Maastricht. The party was
a small, irrelevant force until the 2000s, when Conservatives and
Labour both alienated their traditional bases. Growth of a
democratic deficit and low turnout in European elections in
addition to dissatisfaction with national politics led to higher

9

“Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: The Conservative Manifesto,”
Conservative Party, April 2010, 113.
10
Euroscepticism is a difficult term to properly define because it includes a
broad range of perspectives on European integration. It could simply mean
skepticism of European institutions, but can also include criticism or reformism.
Skepticism or criticism doesn’t necessarily mean opposition to the EU either.
Perspectives can be from the right or the left of the political spectrum. Some
Eurosceptics might prioritize criticizing specific problems with the EU over
others, such as strong desires for economic cooperation and trade but limits on
migration and immigration. Some want reform, while others want disposal of
the entire project. UKIP is an outright rejectionist political force, while the
Conservatives are nuanced and more willing to negotiate membership terms
with the EU.
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returns for UKIP.11 UKIP placed second to the Conservatives in
the 2009 European Parliament elections. The man that arguably
defined the party and led it to national prominence, Nigel Farage,
shifted the party strategy from policy advocacy to heavy
competition for seats in national and local elections.12 The key
moment in this strategy came in 2013, when UKIP had a net gain
of 139 seats in local councils.13 Many saw this as a form of
backlash from mainly Conservative voters, who were disillusioned
by Prime Minister David Cameron and his coalition government
with Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats. David Cameron’s
earlier attempts to regain his base, which were those voters more
sensitive to migration issues and the European Union, had failed
spectacularly. 2013 was incredibly important for the push of a
referendum, because it forced David Cameron to cater to his
party’s Members of Parliament, whose seats were threatened by
diminishing support and the increased vote returns for UKIP. The
trend of voter defections would continue into 2014, when elections
to the European Parliament would be held.
The 2014 European Parliament elections were a significant
turning point in British and European politics. Firstly, political
parties viewed them as a prelude to what was going to come in the
2015 general election, where any number of outcomes could take
place. The coalition government between the Conservatives and

11

Robert Ford, Matthew J. Goodwin, and David Cutts. "Strategic Eurosceptics
and Polite Xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party
(UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament Elections." European Journal of
Political Research 51, no. 2 (2012): 208.
12
Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support
for the Radical Right in Britain (New York: Routledge, 2014), 241-242.
13
Christopher Hope, “Local elections 2013: Nigel Farage's Ukip surges to best
ever showing, winning 150 seats,” The Daily Telegraph, last modified May 3,
2013, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/10036463/Localelections-2013-Nigel-Farages-Ukip-surges-to-best-ever-showing-winning-150seats.html
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Liberal Democrats was incredibly unpopular.14 The European
Parliament elections traditionally served as opportunities for
parties to express policy positions not just on the EU, but also on
domestic issues. The BBC and LBC debates that took place
between UKIP leader Nigel Farage and Deputy Prime Minister
Nick Clegg, were quite symbolic and representative of this
phenomenon. It must be first stated that these debates were far
removed from “normal,” the debates were not about who should
represent the United Kingdom in the European Parliament, rather
they took the role of determining if the country should be in the
EU at all.15 This was a profound moment in British politics, and
supports the point about inversion within the theory of
hyperdemocracy. Secondly, the 2014 elections resulted in UKIP
winning a plurality of seats, the first party to do so since Labour in
the early twentieth century. Research has shown that this election
was ripe for “strategic voting.”16
Using the two individuals who participated in the
aforementioned debates helps shed light on why this was the case.
Farage, a supposed political outsider due to his inability to be
elected to Westminster, embodied the kind of monkey wrench that
many disaffected members of the British electorate craved. They
did not need to agree with all he said, his command of populist
rhetoric, combined with his uncensored and charismatic
personality, were what they craved. European elections, marred by
consistently low turnout in the twenty-first century, bestowed an
opportunity for the electorate to vote for a party who could shake
the political system in Brussels, while keeping domestic politics
relatively untouched. UKIP held no seats in Westminster until
several defections later that year. Clegg had much more on the
14

David Cutts and Andrew Russell, “From Coalition to Catastrophe: The
Electoral Meltdown of the Liberal Democrats,” Parliamentary Affairs 68, no. 1
(2015): 70–87.
15
It should also be noted that UKIP and other rejectionist-Eurosceptics in the
European Parliament are quite fascinating because they are elected to sit in the
very institution they want to disrupt, leave, or dismantle entirely.
16
Ford, Goodwin, and Cutts. “Strategic Eurosceptics,” 208.
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line, not only defending the United Kingdom’s membership in the
EU, but also his party’s electability in the general elections of the
following year. The amount of political capital he had to lose far
exceeded the amount Farage had at all. Thus, he could not make
any serious mistakes. Unfortunately for him, by the end of the two
debates Farage appeared to hold a better position, and one could
easily predict the severity of the Liberal Democrats’ losses, both in
the 2014 European Parliament election and in the 2015 general
election.17 The performance of both candidates in these debates
foreshadowed the electoral picture that would emerge in British
politics over the next few years. The most significant development
from this election is that all over Europe, many Eurosceptic
parties’ vote shares considerably increased.
The 2015 general election displayed a continuation of the
trends that had been sweeping British politics. The Conservatives
were expected to lose to Labour according to the polls, but
sometimes the pollsters do not have a finger on the pulse of the
election. Similar to the debates from 2014, the persona of the
leaders meant more than their positions. Nigel Farage paid
attention to leadership favorability ratings, and quite brilliantly hit
all the right marks in describing the negative leadership qualities of
David Cameron, Nick Clegg, and Ed Miliband. According to
Farage, these men embodied the Blairite politicking of New
Labour, focusing on and representing the young, university
educated, middle class city dwellers. Nigel Farage capitalized on
these characteristics and spoke to the left-behind, or old Labour,
which represented the older, white working-class who were
already Eurosceptic, and had strong feelings about immigration,
free trade agreements and traditional British culture. However, due
to the election system and constituency boundaries, UKIP did not
manage to win any new seats despite having double digit support
nationwide. Additionally, the Conservatives won because UKIP
was not just eating into their vote share, but UKIP also ate slightly
17

Typically, junior coalition partners suffer heavy losses in elections after
entering government. From the BBC debate, Farage won according to a YouGov
poll with 57%. See results: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-26737934
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into the vote share of people who traditionally voted Labour. The
Conservatives emerged from this election with a majority
government and an opportunity to conduct the referendum on
European Union membership that David Cameron had promised at
his famous Bloomberg speech in 2013.18
The Brexit referendum has been characterized as the third
gamble Prime Minister David Cameron made in his string of
gambles with referenda.19 He had emerged politically victorious by
the end of his coalition government with the Liberal Democrats.
Two referendums, the 2011 Alternative Vote Referendum and the
2014 Scottish Independence Referendum, had both worked to his
favor by failing to pass.20 Cameron was going to use the
momentum he had gained from the referendums, and the 2015
general election to make the case for supporting the United
Kingdom remaining in the EU. Unfortunately for him, this
momentum did not match the intensity of the EU issue that
predated his tenure as leader of the Conservatives and his recent
electoral victories.
Welch focuses on the cognitive dimension of democracy to
explain hyperdemocracy. Brexit did not happen in a vacuum.
There were several factors driving the vote to leave.21 The zeitgeist
of the moment pointed toward a result that directed the United
Kingdom to leave the EU. Immigration and issues of sovereignty
defined the campaign. For example, the concurrent European
Migrant-Refugee Crisis only intensified the already divisive
immigration issue. Even though the United Kingdom was not part
18

David Cameron, “EU speech at Bloomberg,” Government of the United
Kingdom (speech, Prime Minister’s Office, 2013).
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg.
19
Harold D. Clarke, Matthew J. Goodwin, and Paul Whiteley. Brexit: Why
Britain Voted to Leave the European Union, (Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 2-3.
20
The Alternative Vote referendum was conducted as part of the agreement
made for the coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. It would change
the electoral system for electing Parliament from the first-past-the-post system
to an instant-runoff system.
21
Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley, Brexit, 153-170.
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of the Schengen Area, media portrayal of migrants and refugees
had an impact on the campaign. As an institution founded on the
freedom of movement, the EU’s perceived inability to control
external borders was attacked by the Leave campaign. Any
observer of the campaign cannot forget the controversial ‘Breaking
Point’ poster launched by UKIP.22
Adding more analysis to the cognitive element promoted by
Welch, the Brexit referendum occurred at such a specific moment
in British politics and history of Europe, that it is quite conceivable
that the concentration and meshing of the conversation in elections
between 2014 and 2016 engendered an eternal campaign. A
campaign that never ends with complex baggage unable to be
dropped by a single vote or referendum. There is not much tangible
evidence to support this claim, but theoretically in a
hyperdemocracy the political campaign never ends, nor does the
intensity or risk. Perhaps this might be due to the media’s role as a
permanent institution of democracy, and that only in a
hyperdemocracy would such an eternal campaign exist.
The Media: A New Constituency?
Inversion and distortion are significant traits of hyperdemocracy.
Welch refers to several areas of liberal democracy where this
appears to be the case. The most notable feature of a healthy liberal
democracy is an objective and honest media culture.23 There
appears to be a crisis of objectivity in the British media. Welch
used the controversy of the MMR vaccine in the 1990s to support
his case.24 The intersection of science, politics, and media
stimulated a hyperdemocratic moment. The media’s involvement
in the controversy chipped away not only at their own objectivity,
22

Josh Lowe, “Brexit: UKIP Launches ‘Breaking Point’ Immigration Poster,”
Newsweek, last modified June 16, 2016.
23
Pippa Norris, A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Postindustrial
Societies (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 2235.
24
Welch, Hyperdemocracy, 124-130.
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but also the objectivity of medical science. The distortion from this
controversy came from the inability to distinguish between
honestly reported facts and mere sensationalism. Journalists do not
all have the privilege of being qualified judges of scientific fact.
Conversely, one scientist or even a tiny cabal of scientists, are not
the sole arbiters of truth. The politicization of science is a key
indicator of hyperdemocracy. The role the media played in the
referendum campaign on EU membership mimicked the role it
played in the interference of scientific inquiry.
The media played a large role in the Brexit referendum. It
is quite common, but problematic in terms of objectivity, for
editorial boards of newspapers and publications to endorse
politicians or political parties in elections. This trend took on a
unique role in the 2016 referendum where endorsement was for
bigger and riskier implications, namely the fate of the country
itself. Statements such as, “The Guardian will make no apology,
between now and 23 June, for making the case for Britain in
Europe as clearly, as honestly and as insistently as possible,”25
and, “In supporting a vote to leave, we [The Daily Telegraph] are
not harking back to a Britannic golden age lost in the mists of time
but looking forward to a new beginning for our country. We are
told it is a choice between fear and hope. If that is the case, then
we choose hope,”26 serve as examples of the media bias taking
place at the time.
Media outlets for either side of the referendum campaign
sought to persuade as many as they could. Instead of endorsing a
party in a “normal” election, the media endorsed a specific action
or inaction with large consequences to follow, regardless of the
outcome. While the referendum on EU membership was
25

“The Guardian view on the EU debate: David Cameron makes a serious case,”
The Guardian, last modified May 9, 2016.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/may/09/the-guardian-viewon-the-eu-debate-david-cameron-makes-a-serious-case
26
“Vote leave to benefit from a world of opportunity,” The Daily Telegraph, last
modified June 20, 2016. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2016/06/20/voteleave-to-benefit-from-a-world-of-opportunity/
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unbinding, it answered an important question about the British
electorate’s willingness to divorce from the EU. The media
participated in the referendum campaign not as objective
correspondents, but as disguised intermediaries of divergent
opinions. In this respect, the media mirrored and fed into the
divided electorate. The democratic process infiltrated the British
media and intensified the referendum campaign.27
Social Media and Hyperdemocracy
It would be a disservice to the theory of hyperdemocracy to not
include analysis of the social media phenomenon. While it might
be useful in political science-oriented research to conduct content
analysis or surveys on internet behaviors, this research explores the
implications of social media. The internet is a treasure trove of
evidence for historians and social scientists alike. However, instead
of finding the hypothetical needle(s) in the haystack that would
provide insight on the specific issue in this paper, it is more
conducive to analyze the meaning of the haystack itself.
In many respects, social media has replaced much of the
political discussion that used to take place in “traditional forums.”
This has occurred in such a significant manner that it has almost
become the new norm in political communication. Social media
allows for the average person with an internet connection, almost
always within arms-reach with the prevalence of cellphones, to be
instantly and simultaneously informed at the same time as the rest
of their fellow citizens about anything of interest or concern.
Manuel Castells theorized this new information age with networks,
stating that “a network-based social structure is a highly dynamic,
open system, susceptible to innovating without threatening its
balance. Networks are appropriate instruments... for a polity geared
27

Banks, businesses, international organizations, public figures, etc. joined in on
the endorsement front of the campaign – further intensifying the campaign and
heightening the risk factor. Boris Johnson dubbed the scaremongering and large
swath of endorsements on the ‘Remain’ side as “Project Fear,” borrowing the
term from the 2014 Scottish independence referendum campaign.
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toward the instant processing of new values and public moods.”28
Social media matured in the mid-2010s, and took on a life of its
own. The Brexit referendum had a serious social media element as
nearly anyone could disseminate their own political opinions and
reactions to the day-to-day politics of the campaign. The concept
of “following” someone on a social media platform was built into a
stream of information customized to confirm each person’s own
biases.29 An individual on these platforms is instantaneously and
intensely informed about politics. As a consequence, social media
allows a person to perceive themselves as empowered within the
democratic process.
Conclusion
This paper has applied a specific theory about the state of liberal
democracy to a specific instance in British political history. While
the theory of hyperdemocracy can be applied in practical forms,
such as in the study of quick and successive elections or pressure
from radical movements like UKIP on established political parties.
In this environment of political accelerationism, it has become
apparent that the traditional media establishment has done their
best to polarize themselves and mirror the divided electorate they
fail to objectively inform. The collapse in trust of traditional media
allowed the vacuum to be filled by social media, where reliable
reporting is hard to come by as tailored information is rapidly
presented and recycled by users, and political identities can easily
be advertised.
28

Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd ed. (Malden, Mass.:
Blackwell Publishers, 1996).
29
Perhaps the darker side of social media revealed after Brexit was the unveiling
of foreign interference on social media platforms. Bots and hackers can
manipulate the algorithmic inner workings of a social media platform to commit
malicious, opinion-modifying campaigns. Whether or not these “troll”
campaigns are effective is not the issue, but the mere fact that these platforms
are being targeted by foreign entities poses a challenge for governments and tech
companies.
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However, where does liberal democracy in the United
Kingdom go from here? The British government thus far has
proved incapable of delivering a promise that it did not support
itself, but half its voting population did. The 2017 general election
saw the Conservatives and the fresh leadership of Theresa May
lose a majority government, despite explicitly promising to
implement Brexit. The inclusion of the so-called “Irish backstop,”
or an indefinite soft border between Northern Ireland and Ireland,
has particularly complicated the negotiations to leave. A deal that
can satisfy a majority in Parliament and be received well among
the public remains to be seen. The uncompromising negotiation
style of the European Union has shown itself to be an issue once
again, with precedent from the painful Greek bailout setting an
example. Surely by the time this piece is published a clearer
picture will have emerged, but for the long-term health of British
politics, the damage has already been done. The political
realignment that has been occurring for the better part of a decade
will not only have to find the right footing in a post-EU United
Kingdom, it will also have to reconcile the two halves of society
that voted differently in the 2016 referendum. Perhaps this will be
a test for the Union itself, an issue with the potential to be even
larger than Brexit.
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